Threat Intelligence & Incident Response

ScreenConnect SCKit attack: what the RMM+ extension flaw means for your business

Attackers used ScreenConnect panels to push SCKit malware through the RMM+ extension. What happened, and what to ask your IT provider this week.

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Short answer: On November 11, 2026, Huntress reported that an attacker was using ScreenConnect remote-support panels to install a second, attacker-controlled copy of ScreenConnect and a toolkit called SCKit on the computers those panels manage. Huntress links the activity to RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key when nobody had set one. ConnectWise disabled five such extensions in the environments it hosts and told self-hosted partners to disable them too. If an IT provider supports your office with ScreenConnect, ask them this week whether any of those extensions was installed, and which remote-support agents on your computers belong to whom.

Obsidian Ridge is a Huntress partner. We cite Huntress's research below and offer managed detection and response at the end.

Key facts

  • Was ScreenConnect hacked? Huntress ties the activity to RMM+, a third-party extension, not to ScreenConnect's own sign-in. Huntress's post also reports that ConnectWise had not yet identified how the attacker got in, so the extension is the strongest lead, not a confirmed finding.
  • What Huntress saw: At least 288 computers across 48 organizations on November 11, and 205 computers across 41 organizations in a second wave on November 13. Huntress counts its own customers only, so these are not totals.
  • What was installed: A rogue ScreenConnect client and SCKit, which Huntress says adds persistence and contains code built to steal the session cookie a technician uses to sign in to the panel.
  • Why MFA did not help: Huntress says RMM+ bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and MFA, and checks one shared access key instead.
  • What ConnectWise did: According to Huntress, ConnectWise disabled Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link across more than 400 partner environments as a precaution, and told on-premises partners to disable them and confirm every technician client runs ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later.
  • Updating alone is not the fix: Huntress says the most current ScreenConnect builds are affected. Turning the extensions off is the step that addresses the weakness Huntress describes.
  • Did it spread on its own? Not as observed. Huntress says the deployments came through the panels, and that it had not seen a successful jump from an infected computer to a technician's workstation.

Ridge Core

Obsidian Ridge's Ridge Core includes endpoint MDR and Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace ITDR at $25 per person per month, month-to-month with no minimum and business onboarding separate. A security team monitors and acts 24/7; Obsidian Ridge provides CISSP-led follow-through within one business day, serving the Research Triangle and businesses across the United States.

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What happened, in plain terms

ScreenConnect is remote-support software from ConnectWise. An IT provider runs a web panel, and every computer it supports carries a small agent. From the panel, a technician can open a session on one computer or run a command on many at once.

Huntress says the attacker used that Run Command feature to execute commands as SYSTEM, the highest privilege on a Windows computer, across groups of managed computers. The commands installed an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client and then SCKit.

What SCKit leaves behind, per Huntress:

  • A scheduled task called TrapWatch that runs as SYSTEM every 10 seconds.
  • A rogue service posing as "Windows Update Agent".
  • A relay component called RelayTrap. Huntress says the toolkit's code is built to steal the session cookie from a technician's workstation and replay it against the panel.

Huntress says the attempt to take over a panel that way failed in every host log it recovered. The danger it describes is the design: an infected computer waiting for a technician to connect.

The suspected way in is RMM+. It exists so that other tools can drive ScreenConnect sessions without a technician in the console. Huntress says it skips ScreenConnect's accounts, roles and MFA and checks a shared access key stored in the extension's settings. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, that key defaulted to blank, and the extension accepted a blank key.

Why this matters if you have never heard of ScreenConnect

Most small offices don't run ScreenConnect themselves. Their IT provider does, and the agent sits on the office's computers. Three lessons from this incident apply to any remote-support tool. These are our conclusions, not Huntress's:

  1. The panel is a key to every computer it manages. Whoever can run commands there can run them on your computers, at the highest privilege.
  2. MFA on the panel protects one door. An add-on that checks its own password is a second door, and Huntress's description of RMM+ is exactly that.
  3. Agents outlive relationships. Nothing removes a remote-support agent when you change IT providers except someone removing it. If a former provider's agent is still installed, its security now depends on a company you no longer pay.

For a dental practice, a law firm or an accounting firm, the computers in question hold patient records, client files and tax returns. The remote-access step in our basics checklist covers the general cleanup. This incident makes it specific.

What to ask your IT provider this week

  1. Do you use ScreenConnect to support us, and is it hosted by ConnectWise or run on your own server?
  2. Was RMM+, RMM Plus, Labtech Plus, or either Password Link extension ever installed on that instance? If so, when was it disabled?
  3. Do your technicians' ScreenConnect clients run version 26.6.5 or later?
  4. Have you reviewed the Run Command and Toolbox history, and the instance audit log, for our computers since November 11? Huntress recommends auditing exactly those.
  5. Which remote-support agents are installed on our computers today, and who owns each one? Our rule: any agent nobody claims comes off.
  6. If one of our computers is suspected, how will you investigate it without connecting through ScreenConnect?

None of these questions accuses anyone. A provider who runs ScreenConnect well can answer all six from records they already keep.

If you run ScreenConnect yourself

These steps come from Huntress's post and from ConnectWise's instructions as Huntress reports them:

  • Disable the five extensions: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link.
  • Confirm every technician client runs 26.6.5 or later. That release, from September 8, 2026, also fixed CVE-2026-84869, a ScreenConnect client flaw CISA lists as known exploited.
  • Don't connect to a suspected computer through ScreenConnect. Huntress recommends WinRM or another out-of-band tool. If a technician already connected, treat that technician's workstation as potentially exposed and investigate it from a clean device.
  • Isolate, then clean. Huntress notes that isolation alone does not remove the persistence. Remove the rogue client, the scheduled task and the toolkit files, and verify the legitimate ScreenConnect client separately first.
  • Revoke access in every place it lives. Huntress lists terminating ScreenConnect web sessions, rotating ScreenConnect credentials, and revoking browser and identity-provider sessions as separate steps. A password change is only one of them.
  • Audit the history. Review Run Command and Toolbox history and the instance audit logs.
  • Keep the computer out of service until the rogue client is removed and the computer has been checked for reinfection.

Timeline

  • September 8, 2026: ConnectWise releases ScreenConnect 26.6.5, which fixes CVE-2026-84869 in the ScreenConnect client.
  • November 11, about 17:47 UTC: Huntress observes suspicious activity. It counts at least 288 affected computers across 48 of its customer organizations, all within about 90 minutes.
  • November 11, 22:45 UTC: ConnectWise posts an advisory naming five third-party extensions that may be associated with the activity, according to Huntress.
  • November 13, 16:12 UTC: Huntress observes a second wave: 205 computers across 41 organizations. One incident involves a self-hosted instance running RMM+.
  • November 13, 5:30 p.m. ET: Huntress publishes its most recent update.
  • Current status: Huntress's latest update describes the way in as suspected, not confirmed. We will update this page if Huntress or ConnectWise confirms it.

Indicators for security teams

All values are from Huntress's November 11 to 13 post. Huntress notes that file hashes are weak indicators here, because the scripts are rebuilt with different embedded values.

IndicatorValueWhere to look
Scheduled taskTrapWatch, which runs TrapWatch.ps1 as SYSTEM every 10 secondsTask Scheduler
FolderC:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, including RelayTrap.exe under trapbinsFile system
Rogue serviceDisplay name "Windows Update Agent", executable UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe in a folder under C:\ProgramData\ named Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)Services
Toolkit filessckit-decoder.ps1, sckit-run.bat, sckit-loader.ps1 and other sckit-* files in %TEMP%File system
Other filesPanel-Lateral.ps1, runnew.cmd, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, sqlite3.exe, LabConfig.ps1, install.ps1, Run-Lateral-Full.batFile system
RegistryRelayTrapLiteAlert value under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunRegistry
Network, second wave185.241.211[.]197 (client host), 007[.]from-ak[.]com (relay)Firewall and DNS logs
Official vendor domainsconnectwise.com, screenconnect.comFor comparison only
Extensions disabled by ConnectWiseLabtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password LinkScreenConnect extension settings

Where Obsidian Ridge fits

The lesson here is not "avoid ScreenConnect". Every remote-support tool is powerful by design. The lesson is that someone has to watch what those tools do on your computers, separately from the provider who operates them.

Ridge Core includes managed detection and response on your computers: a security team monitors and acts around the clock, and Obsidian Ridge handles everything past containment within one business day. If you would like a second opinion on the answers you get to the six questions above, bring them to a free review.

Sources

Ridge Core

Obsidian Ridge's Ridge Core includes endpoint MDR and Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace ITDR at $25 per person per month, month-to-month with no minimum and business onboarding separate. A security team monitors and acts 24/7; Obsidian Ridge provides CISSP-led follow-through within one business day, serving the Research Triangle and businesses across the United States.

Discuss Ridge Core

Last updated

November 16, 2026. We refresh this content as the threat landscape and tools evolve.

Questions readers usually ask next

Was ScreenConnect hacked?

Attackers used ScreenConnect panels to push malware to the computers those panels manage. Huntress says the activity seems to be related to RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension, rather than to ScreenConnect's own sign-in.

Huntress also reports that ConnectWise had not yet identified how the attacker got in, so the extension is the strongest lead, not a confirmed finding.

What is SCKit?

SCKit is the name Huntress gave to the toolkit installed in this campaign.

Huntress says it arrives with a second, attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client, keeps itself running through a scheduled task called TrapWatch, and contains code built to steal the session cookie a technician uses to sign in to the ScreenConnect panel.

What is the RMM+ extension, and why did it matter?

RMM+ is a third-party ScreenConnect extension that lets another tool manage ScreenConnect sessions without a technician working in the console.

Huntress says it bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and MFA and checks one shared access key instead. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, if an administrator never set that key, the extension accepted a blank one.

Does updating ScreenConnect fix this?

Not by itself. Huntress says the most current ScreenConnect builds are affected, because the weakness Huntress points to is in the extension.

The step ConnectWise gave on-premises partners is to disable the named extensions, and separately to confirm that every technician client runs ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later.

My IT provider uses ScreenConnect. What should I ask them?

Ask whether RMM+, RMM Plus, Labtech Plus or either Password Link extension was ever installed on the instance that manages your computers, whether their technicians' clients run 26.6.5 or later, and whether they have reviewed the Run Command and Toolbox history for your computers since November 11.

Also ask which remote-support agents are installed on your computers today and who owns each one.

Should a technician connect to an infected computer through ScreenConnect to clean it up?

No. Huntress says not to connect to a suspected computer through ScreenConnect, because an interactive session can expose the technician's own workstation.

It recommends WinRM or another out-of-band tool, and says a technician who already connected should treat their workstation as potentially exposed and investigate it from a clean device.

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